QuantDAO
  • Introduction
    • What is QuantDAO?
    • Treasury Mechanics
      • Proposals and Voting
        • Participation Incentives
      • PRM
      • Risk Management
    • Staking and Revenue Share
      • Staked QD (sQD)
        • Advanced Overview
    • Token Utility and Details
      • Why Uniswap V4?
      • Contracts and Addresses
      • Audit
    • Roadmap/Blueprint
  • Advanced Features
    • QuantBonds
      • Issuance
      • Normal Periods
      • Abnormal Bonds
    • AI Governance Tools
      • Application of AI Agents
    • V2
      • Spillover Bonds
      • Collateralization
        • Leveraging $QD
        • Strategic Actions
      • Multichain Support
      • DAO Portfolio
      • Splits
  • Additional Resources
    • FAQs
      • Concise Overview
    • Guest Development
      • Bug Bounty
    • Socials, etc
      • Image Pack
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  1. Introduction
  2. Treasury Mechanics

Proposals and Voting

PreviousTreasury MechanicsNextParticipation Incentives

Last updated 4 months ago

Prior to our in-house voting system, the operations of launching proposal and voting periods will be performed through (previously Snapshot.org), and market actions will be performed manually (via ), and data released via a at the end of each cycle.

Snapshot.box is a viable stopgap as it is easily auditable and allows DAO members to review the submissions, votes, and final quorums reached simply.

During proposal periods, users cast their vote reflecting symbol and token address, separated by a semicolon. Examples below,

  • USDT;0xdac17f958d2ee523a2206206994597c13d831ec7

  • AAVE;0x7fc66500c84a76ad7e9c93437bfc5ac33e2ddae9

  • UNI;0x1f9840a85d5af5bf1d1762f925bdaddc4201f984

* Note that USDC and "add more liquidity" will always be available in the final vote, so no need to add these options explicitly. Adding to LP will present a unique reward, where the LP tokens created will be eventually be redistributed, allowing DAO members to benefit directly from pool fees.

If a user does not follow this exact entry method, the submission will not be parsed.

After proposition (lasting 72 hours), the top 5 tokens will be subject to a voting period lasting 48 hours. Members then only need to make a selection. The asset with the most number of votes is purchased by the DAO.

After purchase, a nested bi-weekly timeline begins concurrently; the DAO holds said asset while another cycle begins. An example;

Week 1: Sunday 12:00:00 UTC: Propose assets

- 72 hours pass -

Wednesday 12:00 UTC: Proposal period ends, top 5 assets are put to vote

- 24 hour buffer -

Thursday 12:00 UTC: Voting period begins

- 48 hours pass -

Saturday 12:00 UTC: Voting period ends, "Asset A" is chosen, additional actions performed

- 24 hour buffer -

Week 2: Sunday 12:00:00 UTC: Propose assets

- 72 hours pass -

Wednesday 12:00 UTC: Proposal period ends, top 5 assets are put to vote

- 24 hour buffer -

Thursday 12:00 UTC: Voting period begins

- 48 hours pass -

Saturday 12:00 UTC: Voting period ends, "Asset A" is sold, "Asset B" is purchased, additional actions performed

- 24 hour buffer -

Repeat

These time frames are by no means set in stone and prior to decentralization will be deeply discussed with DAO members to find what's most suitable for the organization. For example, a 10-day epoch may be more reasonable.

Upon decentralization, time frames will be approximate as they will be based on Ethereum block times, and buffer periods will be greatly reduced as operations will be automated.

The DAO cannot purchase $QD as part of its weekly cycle, as this not only presents a self-leveraged scenario, but also causes technical issues in regards to asset sale and distribution. If the DAO's focus is simply to minimize risk and maximize purchasing $QD, stablecoins should be used.

When stablecoins or LP increase is selected, bonds are not issued.

Snapshot.box
Gnosis Safe
public review memo
as a "Reason"
Page cover image